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THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL VERSUS PASSPORT
AREA RESTRICTIONS
I am lost like a beast in an enclosure
Somewhere are people, freedom and light,...
Here I am cut off from everything
Whatever shall be is the same to me.
But what wicked thing have I done?
I the murderer and villain;
I who forced the whole world
To cry over the beauty of my land.
But in any case I am near my grave
And I believe the time will come
When the Spirit of good
Will conquer wickedness and infamy.
Boris Pasternak1
An international incident was created when Boris Pasternak re-
jected the Nobel Prize for his non-conformist novel, Doctor Zhivago,
which is banned in Russia. Over a year later British and American
newspapers printed the above poem, again focusing the world's at-
tention upon this example of totalitarianism.
Frighteningly similar are the allegations of the eminent American
chemist, Dr. Linus Pauling.2 As presented before the Senate Sub-
committee on Constitutional Rights in 1955, they appear as follows:
Linus Pauling, an American of native born parents, had earned the
Presidential Medal for Merit, the highest award given to civilians,
for his work on highly sensitive military projects during World War
II. In 1951 the Royal Society in London called a special symposium
in order to hear him describe his latest discoveries. After numerous
trips to Washington, non-Communist affidavits, and repeated post-
ponements of the engagement, Pauling had the Royal Society cancel
the meeting. Despite his Army and Navy certificates for war work
and the Presidential Medal for Merit, he had been denied a pass-
port because of his associations with groups on the Attorney Gen-
erars list of subversive organizations. Domestically the action was
criticized severely because he was denied a passport without any
I The poem appeared in the Louisville Courier-Journal, Feb. 14, 1959, page
12, which quoted the poem as published in the London Daily Mail, Feb. 2, 1959.
2 The substance of Pauling's allegations appears in the Hearings on Security
and Constitutional Rights Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 103-40 (1955).
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sort of trial, hearing or appeal.3 In addition, Sir Robert Robertson,
President of the Royal Society, wrote a letter in the-May 5th edition
of the Times deploring Pauling's confinement.4
Following this incident Pauling was issued a passport to go abroad
to address different societies. Then in 1953 Pauling again applied
for a passport. This time he was to appear in Israel before the Weitz-
man Institute, in Athens for a week's lecture at the University, in
India (at the invitation of the government) to address the Indian
Science Congress and participate with Nehru in dedicating a new
science laboratory, and then in Thailand and Japan. After thirty-
eight communications with the State Department, trips to New York
and Washnigton, and the ineffectual hiring of a lawyer, Pauling re-
luctantly started cancelling the engagement as the passport refusal
dragged on. He later testified that he signed numerous non-Com-
munist affidavits and was most concerned over the fact that his pro-
posed tour as a good will ambassador was being converted into a
propaganda tool for anti-American sentiment. But despite Pauling's
efforts, no passport was forthcoming. All engagements were can-
celled except the commitment in India; the Indian government was
not to be discouraged. In 1954, however, Pauling received a letter
from the passport office which stated:
The Department... has concluded on the basis of evidence at hand
that your activities during the years following World War II have
demonstrated a consistent and prolonged adherence to the Communist
Party line on a variety of issues, and through shifts and changes
of that line. .... 5
Thirty-two days later Pauling was awarded the Nobel Prize for Chem-
istry. Unlike Pasternak, Pauling received at this point an unrestricted
passport.
Another incident of even greater prominence may be found in the
series of events surrounding the passport of Judge William Clark
which culminated in Clark v. Dulles.6 In a 1957 hearing before the
3 See Strout, "Win a Prize-Get a Pasport," New Republic, Nov. 28, 1955,
p. 11. This account, an accurate summary of the information disclosed in the
Subcommittee Hearings, is at points paraphrased in this note. It states (p. 12):[A] sample of the feeling in scientific circles was a letter signed by the
all full professors of the Institute of Nuclear Physics at the University
of Chicago except one who was not a citizen. The list inculded Enrico
Fermi, Edward Teller, Willard F. Libby (one of the Atomic Energy
Commissioners at the time) and in fact the majority of those who were
responsible for the development of the A-bomb and H-bomb.... To
withdraw his passport, they said, without a trial, without a hearing
and without recourse to an appeal was shocking.
4 Id. at 12.
G Letter from R. B. Shipley to Linus Pauling, Oct. 1, 1954, in Hearings on
Security and Constitutional Rights Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Committee on Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 137 (1955).
6 Clark v. Dulles, 129 F. Supp. 950 (D.D.C. 1955).
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Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Judge Clark read a statement
which summarizes his experience:
Until I was commissioned in the Army a month after Pearl Harbor,
I had been successively a member of the court of appeals of my
state, a United States district judge, and a member of the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
After my discharge from the Army, I was appointed legal con-
sultant to General Clay, then military governor of the United States
occupied zone of Germany.
I was reappointed chief justice (of the civilian court system of
Germany] on January 7, 1950, by Secretary Acheson when the State
Department took over the administration of the occupied zone of
Germany. I served as such until I made the mistake (sic) of ob-jecting to the oppression of American citizens by the Nazi-type Ger-
man police and judicial authorities. I was then relieved on the
false and ridiculous allegation that I was surplus and, with the State
Department's accompanying statement-and I quote-"We have no
place in Germany for a judge of Judge Clark's ability and experi-
ence."
7
He later observed: Nothing to my mind has made the United
States look more ridiculous in the eyes of the world than our policy
of tyranny by passport control.a
The most spectacular event concerning Judge Clark occurred out-
side the United States. After his removal he refused to leave Ger-
many because his commission had one year remaining. While carry-
ing on his fight with the State Department over his right to the job,
he took a Christmas vacation to the Canary Islands. This was his
mistake. While on vacation he was met by a State Department of-
ficial, who, with the aid of a platoon of armed Spanish gendarmes,
forcibly took Judge Clark's passport from him and gave him a one-
way passport home without even allowing the judge to return to
Germany for winter clothes.9
The above discussion involves the denial of a citizen's right to
travel freely outside his nation's boundary. In the 1958 case of
Kent v. Dulles,'0 the Supreme Court recognized that "the right to
travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be de-
prived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.""-
passports on the basis of political beliefs and thereby restrict the
The Court held that the State Department lacked authority to deny
7 Hearings on Nominahon of Scott McLeod Before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1957).8 Id. at 27.
9Id. at 30-31. See also Hearings on Security and Constitutional Rights.
Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 144-45 (1955).
10 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
11 Id. at 125.
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travel of suspected Communists or Communist sympathizers. Since
that time, there has been no legal controversy concerning travel con-
trol through the denial of passports. But the State Department has
continued its policy of stamping passports "not valid for use in the
following designated countries ... " This has been called the "geo-
graphical area restriction" device and is of general application to all
passport holders, though the ban is customarily waived for any per-
son whose travel is deemed by the Secretary to be in the "best in-
terest of the United States." The Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia originally upheld the Department's passport
denial policy in Briehl v. Dulles2 but was reversed in Kent v. Dulles.13
Recently this court again upheld the Department's travel control
policy, this time in the form of a passport area restriction.14 The
Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case 15 and thus refused to
rule on the validity of this policy.
The aim of this paper is to consider the basis for authorizing the
State Department's present power in restricting passport use to cer-
tain areas. Avoiding legal verbiage, the problem involves two basic
questions: (1) Is there something so significant about the travel of
United States citizens that the Secretary of State cannot adequately
perform his duties without controlling this travel? and (2) Is there
any rational basis for distinction between denying passports and re-
stricting passport use to certain areas? The purpose for reciting the
experiences of Pastemak, Pauling and Clark is to anticipate in ad-
vance the arguments of those who maintain that modem Americans'
need not fear abuse if the State Department be allowed the dis-
cretionary power to control the travel of American citizens to par-
ticular areas. There seems no apparent reason to believe that the
present power to restrict passport use as to area will be exercised
any more reasonably than was the former power to deny passports
as shown in the Pauling and Clark cases.
It is true that a more or less general ban on travel to a particular
country has a different impact from denying particular individuals
the right to travel anywhere outside the country. Thus the justifica-
tion for, and the consequences of, the power to restrict passport use
presents a different question from the passport denial problem in the
Kent case. However, the right of free movement is the constitutional
value being regulated; the only difference is in the manner and de-
gree of the restriction. In determining whether the State Department
12248 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1957), but see the brilliant dissent of Bazelon,
id. at 579, for a superb legal analysis which was vindicated on appeal.
13 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
14 Worthy v. Herter 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
15 80 Sup. Ct. 255 (1959).
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has the power to impose the present type of restriction, the Court
necessarily will be bound to support its decision with much the same
legal precedent called upon in the Kent case. The legal rationaliza-
tion may be moulded to fit whatever result one's bias suggests.16
Therefore the decision facing the Court, the Congress, and the people
must ultimately be resolved by their evaluation of the social factors
involved. In such a situation where stare decisis does not compel
a particular decision, the conventional legal expression for the judi-
cial decision-making process is called "balancing the interests."
Until the last decade the government imposed no general area
restrictions on the right to travel except when this country was at
war with the interdicted country, or that country was involved in
hostilities with a third country or undergoing a civil war.17 In justi-
fication of the recent practices, three basic arguments have emerged:
(1) the presence of Americans in certain areas materially increases
the danger of a third world war through international incidents which
they are prone to provoke; (2) United States citizens should be
denied the right to travel in areas where the State Department can-
not afford them protection; and (3) the power to declare certain
areas of the earth off-limits to American citizens is a necessary
adjunct to effectuation of our foreign policy.
That the travel of Americans to sensitive areas may cause inter-
national incidents precipitating war was the primary rationalization
of Judge Prettyman in Worthy v. Herter,8 where the State Depart-
ment was sustained in its refusal to permit a newspaper reporter,
William Worthy, to travel in Communist China. The court pointed
out that Worthy's freedom was subject to restriction and that his
contemplated activity was so dangerous as to warrant prohibition.
As this is the only significant decision rendered upon the validity
of area restrictions, it will be analyzed in some detail. Excerpts from
the court's opinion and consideration thereof follow:
In case of a reasonably anticipated threat to security or to law and
order, many acts my individuals can be resricted. An assembling
mob bent on disorder can be dispersed. A man with a contagious
16See, for example: Barnett, "Passport Administration and the Courts," 32
Oregon L. Rev. 193 (1953); Doman, "A Comparative Analysis: Do Citizens
Have the Right To Travel," 43 A.B.A.J. 307 (1957); Parker, "The Right To Go
Abroad: To Have And To Hold A Passport,, 40 Va. L. Rev. 853 (1954); Wyzan-
ski, "Freedom to Travel," Atlantic Monthly, October, 1952, p. 66. For an illum-
inating and up-to-date student discussion, see Note, "The Right to Travel Con-
sidered in the Light of Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Determinations to
Date," 22 Ga. B. J. 254 (1959).
:17 Report of the Special Committee to Study Passport Procedures of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Freedom to Travel 16 (1958).18270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 80 sup. ct. 255 (1959).
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disease can be locked in his house. Potentially dangerous actions
must be restricted in order to prevent harm to others. So we have
sanitation, fire, building and speeding regulations. 19
This passage seems a questionable application of truisms to support
the particular decision of the court, i.e., that Worthy's travel could be
restricted. The court ignored the fact that, although "a man with
a contagious disease can be locked in his house," a man with the
"contagious" disease of Communism and "bent on disorder" in the
international neighborhood cannot now be "locked' in his country.
The Kent case was distinguished with brisk observation: [T]he point
presented here in no wise resembles the matter decided by the
Supreme Court in Kent v. Dulles .... In the case at bar no beliefs,
associations, or personal characteristics are involved.20 Approximately
two pages followed again establishing the power to restrict indi-
vidual action by pointing to regulations far less closely analogous
than the restriction involved in the Kent case which the court dis-
missed as being in no wise similar. For example, the court stated:
A man who asserts his own uninhibited freedom to go where he
pleases is a menace and is quickly put in his place. He may not
park where he pleases, or drink where he pleases, or spit where
he pleases. In the community the police take care of these matters,
and in so doing the officers act as servants of the rest of the com-
munity; they are the government. 21
In addition to the remoteness of the analogies drawn upon, one
may also observe that the court here ignores that although the police
"take care" of these matters, they are not the "government" as they
have only the power to enforce impartially the regulations promul-
gated by the legislative body. It is well settled that any legislation
allowing the police discretion in such matters is unconstitutional.22
In further support of the power to restrict the right to travel,
the court said:
The peace-loving have rights. Those who recognize the fimda-
mental necessities of liberty as a delicate product of order have
power to protect themselves and their liberty. . . . The people
have a right to protect their liberty, no matter from whence the
threat. . . . The customary prompt transformation of unrestrained
liberty into dictatorship is one of the poignant lessons of history.23
It is submitted that the generalizations cited by the court in the
above passage do not afford real help in resolving the ultimate issue
'OId. at 908.
20 Id. at 907.
21 Id. at 908.
22 Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Saia v. New York, 334
U.S. 558 (1947); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
23 270 F.2d at 908-09.
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of whether Worthy's passport could be restricted. In evaluating his
observation of the "poignant lessons of history," the reader might be
well advised to focus attention upon perhaps the most penetrating
and profound analysis ever made of America and democratic insti-
tutions in general. Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America
presented somewhat different views from the court:
I am persuaded, however, that anarchy is not the principal evil
which democratic ages have to fear, but the least. For the prin-
ciple of equality begets two tendencies: the one leads men straight
to independence, and may suddenly drive them into anarchy; the
other conducts them by a longer, more secret, but more certain
road, to servitude.
• . . The love of public tranquility is frequently the only passion
which these nations retain, and it becomes more active and powerful
amongst them in proportion as all other passions droop and die.
This naturally disposes the members of the community constantly
to give or to surrender additional rights to the central power, which
alone seems to be interested in defending them by the same means
that it uses to defend itself.
. . . After having thus successively taken each member of the
community in its powerful grasp, and fashioned him at will, the
supreme power then extends its arm over the whole community.
It covers the surface of society with a network of small complicated
rules, minute and uniform, through which the most original minds
and the most energetic characters cannot penetrate, to rise above
the crowd. The will of man is not shattered, but softened, bent,
and guided; men are seldom forced by it to act, but they are con-
stantly restrained from acting: such a power does not destroy, but
it prevents existence; it does not tyrannize, but it compresses, ener-
vates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is
reduced to be nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious
animals, of which the government is the shepherd.
. . . It is therefore most especially in the present democratic ages
that the true friends of the liberty and the greatness of man ought
constantly to be on the alert to prevent the power of government
from lightly sacrificing the private rights of individuals to the
general execution of its designs.
... As the ordinary notions of equity and morality no longer suffice
to explain and justify all the innovations daily begotten . . . the
principle of public utility is called in, the doctrine of political
necessity is conjured up, and men accustom themselves to sacrifice
private interest without scruple, and to trample on the rights of
individuals in order more speedily to accomplish any public purpose.
.. [I]t is ever to be feared that revolutionary tendencies, becoming
more gentle and more regular, without entirely disappearing from
society, will be gradually transformed into habits of subjection to
the administrative authority of the government.24
24 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 302, 308, 333, 341, 342
(Reeve Transl. 1900). Lest we think the observations of De Tocqueville be
outdated, consider the recent observations of a great modern commentator, Ernst
Cassirer in The Myth of the State 362 & n. 4 ( . .
To fulfill this demand becomes especially bard in times of a severe
and dangerous social crisis when the breakdown of the whole public
life seems to be imminent. At these times the individual begins to
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But to return to the opinion in the Worthy case, in addition to
establishing to its satisfaction that the right to travel could be re-
stricted by the government and that the Kent case was not in point,
the court also explained why the restriction in the Worthy case was
justified with the following language:
[Tlhere is presently in the world a deadlock of antagonistic forces,
susceptible of erupting into a fatal cataclysm. The capacity of inci-
dents arising from the conduct of individuals to ignite that con-
flagration is well proven.
. . . In foreign affairs . . . an individual's uninhibited yen to go
and to inquire may be circumscribed. A blustering inquisitor avow-
ing his own freedom to go and do as he pleases can throw the whole
international neighborhood into turmoil.25
The likelihood of a modem war resulting from the meddling of in-
dividual Americans abroad may be questioned as an easy assump-
tion and one which is not "well proven." We have seen numerous
examples of the most extreme treatment of innocent Americans. The
unhappiness visited upon American missionaries and others by the
Chinese is a case in point. The William Otis case is also well known.
These incidents caused considerable tension. The State Department
certainly can deal more effectively with the countries involved when
it can seal off those countries from the travel of American citizens.
But these incidents did not "ignite that conflagration" into the "fatal
cataclysm" suggested by Judge Prettyman. One may reasonably
question the possibility and probability of a chance ignition of a
hydrogen war by the blunderings of Americans abroad. It is pos-
sible that, with all countries fearing such a war, only deliberate ac-
tion will precipitate major combat. If it is true that there is less
chance of war through the action of luckless travelers today than in
feel a deep mistrust of his own powers. Freedom is not a natural
inheritance of man. In order to possess it we have to create it.
If man were simply to follow his natural instincts he would not
strive for freedom; he would rather choose dependence. Obviously
it is much easier to depend upon others than to think, to judge, and
to decide for himself. That accounts for the fact that both in indi-
vidual and in political life freedom is so often regarded much more
as a burden than a privilege. Under extremely difficult conditions
man tries to cast off this burden. Here the totalitarian state and the
political myths step in....
"To a German grocer, not unwilling to explain things to an
American visitor," relates Stephen Raushenbush, "I spoke of our
feeling that something invaluable had been given up when freedom
was surrendered. He replied: 'But you don't understand at all.
Before this we had to worry about elections, and parties and voting.
We bad responsibilities. But now we don't have any of that. Now
we're free.'
See Raushenbush, The March of Fascism 40 (1939).
25 270 F.2d at 910-11.
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the past, it may be relevant to question why control of Americans'
travel to sensitive global areas was historically thought unnecessary
prior to 1949,26 but is now a necessary ingredient of government.
A typical example of the "duty of protection" argument is the
statement of the Deputy Undersecretary of State before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations investigating Department of State
passport policies in 1957:
[T]he Secretary of State may, from time to time, decide that the
safety of American citizens cannot be fully protected in certain
countries. This is one of the reasons for the . . . recent ban on
travel to the four nations in the Middle East: Israel, Egypt, Jordan,
and Syria.
• . . When the Secretary believes that the current situation in any
particular country is stable once more, he then may lift the ban on
travel there either for particular groups or for all citizens. Yester-
day, as the most recent case in point, as I have said, the situation
in the Middle East was considered to have stabilized sufficiently
for the four country ban to be removed.27
The impact of the middle-eastern ban referred to by Undersec-
retary Murphy may be shown graphically by statistics taken from the
Passport Office files. 28
Percentage of Total
Passport Holders Visiting Israel Number Passport Recipients
Pre-ban January-September 1956 2,983 ?
During ban January-September 1957 192* ?
Post-ban July-September 1958 3,868 3%
* The ban was lifted on April 1, 1957 and some of the 192 passports were undoubtedly
issued after the ban was removed. Some of the 192 passports probably represent those pass-
ports issued during the ban to people whose travel was considered in the "best interest
of the United States."
This table demonstrates that a one-country ban can frustrate
a significant number of would be travellers.
In protest of this ban representatives of the 800,000 member
American Jewish Congress have repeatedly appeared before congres-
sional committees. Their statement before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations contained several interesting arguments.&2 9 It first
observed that "despite departmental claims that the prohibition de-
rived from official contention that 'the safety of American citizens
could not be fully protected', . . . it was in fact continued long past
26 See note 15 supra.
27 Hearings on Department of State Passport Policies Before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1957).
28 Hearings on the Right to Travel Before the Subcommittee on Consti-
tutional Bights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
385, 395 (1957).
29 Hearings on Passport Legislation Before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 141-51 (1959).
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the time when disorder had ceased and allowed to operate instead
as a form of economic sanction or pressure upon Israel sorely in need
of the springtime Passover and Easter tourist tarffic." 30 It noted that
Syria and Jordan were covered by the ban although they were not
involved in the hostilities, and that Lebanon, a member of the Arab
League who had not yet signed a peace treaty with Israel, was not.
The statement also pointed out that the ban was imposed on No-
vember 8, 1956, two days after all four of the parties to the hostil-
ities had formally agreed to a cease-fire and was continued until
April 1, 1957.
The Jews were particularly incensed that although such travel
as was considered in the national interest was permitted to con-
tinue, the centuries-old pilgrimage of Jewish religious leaders to
the Holy Land was not considered within that category.
In further refutation of the "protection" argument, the state-
ment asserted "Great Britain, France, and Canada, and in fact
every other country in the world imposed no such ban upon their
nationals, contenting themselves merely with advising them about
the risks of travel in this area."31
It continued:
[Despite] wholesale kidnaping of American nationals in Cuba, there
has never for a single day been a ban upon travel to that country.
Even more remarkably, although yesterday our Government was
called upon to land the Marine forces in Lebanon, the State De-
partment did not at that time find it necessary to curb travel to
that country, relying only upon admonitions addressed to the dis-
cretion of private travelers.32
In view of these arguments, the contention that the Secretary im-
poses area restrictions as a protective measure for travelers seems
in some instances unrealistic.
One can hardly question the argument that the power of travel
control would enhance the efficiency of the State Department in per-
forming its function in foreigu affairs. But one can question whether
the increased efficiency is worth the price. Is travel control a tool
essential to effecting an adequate foreign policy? Has some world
change occurred since the second world, war which requires this
new power? Has the value traditionally accorded this individual
freedom lost currency in the modem world? The problem was well
stated by the late Justice Robert Jackson:
It seems to me that these traditional freedoms are less in danger
of any sudden overthrow than of being gradually bartered or traded
3od. at 146.
31 Ibid.32 Ibid.
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for something else on which people place a higher current value.
In this anxiety-ridden time, many are ready to exchange some of
their liberties for a real or fancied increase in security against ex-
ternal foes, internal betrayers or criminals. Others are eager to bar-
gain away local controls for a federal subsidy. Many will give up
individual rights for promise of collective advantages. The real
question posed by the Fascist and Communist movements, which
together have captivated a large part of the world's population, is
whether, today, liberty is regarded by the masses of men as their
most precious possession. Certainly in the minds of many foreign
peoples our type of individual liberty has been outvalued by prom-
ises of social welfare and economic security, which they want too
passionately to be critical of the price. If this indifference to tradi-
tional values should spread to us, it would be the greatest threat
to our own liberties.33
In the early 1950's it seemed that the country was seriously en-
dangered by the threat of internal communism. Certainly the execu-
tive could have dealt more effectively with the problem of ferreting
out the hidden Communists but for ,the traditional safeguards pro-
vided the individual by the fourth and fifth amendments. Despite
frightful cries of "Fifth Amendment Communist," the loss in efficiency
was not thought too great a price to pay for the values protected by
the safeguards-though inroads have been made which were later
noted by distinguished commentators. 34
In determining whether the resultant greater efficiency justifies
the regulation of the right to travel, we may want to consider the
specific interests affected by such regulations. In this consideration
only substantive matters will be discussed. Procedural matters such
as the right to a hearing and the right to equal treatment under the
law will not be evaluated in relation to this problem. The substan-
tive interests involved might be summarized as follows:
(1) The public has the power and the duty to hold the admin-
istration accountable at the polls for its foreign policies and their
execution. But the public cannot do this if its knowledge of foreign
events can be inhibited by the power of the State Department to
isolate whole areas of the earth from American news reporting.
(2) We are in an international struggle for the minds of men.
Both sides claim the banner of freedom. The uncommitted nations
of the world believe only what they see and today they see the
United States denouncing the "Iron" and "Bamboo" curtains while
partially curtailing the travel of its own citizens. The Chinese are
33 Jackson, "The Task of Maintaining Our Liberties: The Role of the Judi-
ciary," 39 A.B.A.J. 961, 963 (1953).34 Chafee, Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787, at 193-98(1956); Cushman, Civil Liberties in the United States 113-116 (1956); Gellhorn,
Individual Freedom and Governmental Restraints 14-15 (1956); O'Brain, National
Security and Individual Freedom 88-48 (1955).
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able to say that the United States is afraid to let their people know
the truth about the 'Peoples Republic." When government-selected
news reporters are allowed to go to China by the State Department,
the Communist propaganda is that we select trusted representatives
to report as the government dictates. Consider our newspapers' com-
ment when Russia allows a few representatives to travel to the
United States.35
(3) The ultimate hope for peace and human understanding can
only be achieved by the freest sort of human intercourse. The fears
and misunderstandings of mankind can only be removed by associ-
ating with and finding out about the unknown and suspected people.
(4) Gradual centralization of power in derogation of individual
freedom poses a greater threat of autocracy than the external forces
of Communism. The words of Justice Frankfurter in the Youngs-
town Steel case more eloquently present this argument than any
paraphrase this author could formulate:
The Founders of this nation were not imbued with the modem
cynicism that the only thing that history teaches is that it teaches
nothing .... These long-headed statesmen had no illusion that our
people enjoyed biological psychological or sociological immunities
from the hazards of concentrated power. . . .The accretion of
dangerous power does not come in a day. It does come, however
slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard of the
restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of
authority.30
..A scheme of government like ours no doubt at times feels the
lack of power to act with complete, all embracing, swiftly moving
authority. No doubt a government with distributed authority labors
under restriction from which other governments are free. It has not
been our tradition to envy such governments. In any event our
government was designed to have such restrictions. The price was
deemed not too high in view of the safeguards which these re-
strictions afford.3 7
Conclusion
For the first time in history Americans must decide whether
their executive should be left with the authority to determine to
what areas of the earth they shall be allowed to travel. Conservatives
and moderates urge that the danger of international incidents and
35 It is not the author's intent to equate the minimum restrictions of the
United States with the almost complete isolation technique of the Communist
world. Rather it is to suggest that our techniques have provided effective prop-
aganda tools for anti-American sentiment. Perhaps the advice of Sir Winston
Churchill speaking before the Commons, May 12, 1916, is appropriate here:
In war, if you are not able to beat your enemy at his own game,
it is nearly always better to adopt some striking variant and not to
be content with doing the same thing your enemy is doing, only
not doing it quite so well or on quite so large a scale.36 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1952).37 Id. at 613.
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the furtherance of an effective foreign policy in this atomic age re-
quire that the, State Department be allowed this discretion. The lib-
erals argue that this great nation is not so perilously poised upon
the brink of national disaster as to require such restrictive power;
that it is unconstitutional for the executive to assume the paternalis-
tic prerogative of using citizens and their travel as tools in the
everyday vacillations of foreign diplomacy; that what must be re-
peated here, and reaffirned, is the right of Americans to go, as
Americans have always gone, to all parts and corners of the world
to look, see, wonder, criticize and learn. And, in the absence of active
hostilities in which this country is a participant, to do so without
prior permission or restraint by the President, the Secretary of State
or any other official or functionary of the government.38
Finally, the inarticulate fears of many about the executive's
power over foreign relations find their roots in the idea expressed
in a letter by Madison to Jefferson in 1798 where he said:
The management of foreign relations appears to be the most sus-
ceptible of abuse of all the trust committed to a Government, be-
cause they can be concealed or disclosed, or disclosed in such parts
and at such times as will best suit particular views; and because
the body of the people are less capable of judging and are more
under the influence of prejudices, on that branch of their affairs,
than of any other. Perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of
liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against danger, real
or pretended, from abroad.39
G. W. Shadoan
38 See the statement of the American Jewish Congress cited in note 29
supra, at 146-47.39 Padover, The Complete Madiosn 257-58 (1958).
